The Concept of Flexibility in Labour Law. The Italian case in the European context. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" N. 22/2004 by Caruso, Bruno.
 
Università degli Studi di Catania 
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
 
 
 
 
Bruno Caruso 
 
 
 
The Concept of Flexibility in Labour Law. The Italian 
case in the European context 
 
 
 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” N.  39/ 2004 1 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  39/2004 
 
The Concept of Flexibility in Labour Law. The Italian 
case in the European context
* 
 
 
 
Bruno Caruso 
University of Catania 
 
§ 1: Foreword: flexibility as a magic formula............................. 2 
I. Flexibility: three persons in one…. ..................................... 2 
II. Redundant flexibility....................................................... 5 
§ 2: Stages in the evolution of labour law in Italy in the wake of 
the flexibility paradigm .......................................................... 7 
I. Flexibility as a stigma (the ‘70s)........................................ 8 
II. Flexibility as a necessary evil (the '80s) ...........................10 
III. Flexibility as an objective necessity (the 90s) ..................13 
§ 3: Flexibility as an ideology (the present) .............................22 
I. The Berlusconi/Maroni (not Biagi) reform. .........................24 
a. Main contents ...............................................................24 
b. Legal policy and regulatory techniques .............................29 
§ 4: Flexibility as a challenge for European Labour Law .............32 
§ 5: A Final remark. Flexibility and trade union representation ...35 
                                                 
*   Di prossima pubblicazione nel volume Flexibility in Employment and Labour Market 
Legislation in Europe: Comparing Italy and Germany  ,  a cura di B Caruso e M. Fuchs, 
Nomos Verlag - Giuffrè 2                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  39/2004 
 
§ 1: Foreword: flexibility as a magic formula 
  Is it possible to observe changes in labour law through the 
kaleidoscope of the concept of flexibility? One would instinctively be 
advised to proceed with caution. The concept is by no means settled and 
is above all used in various guises in a number of different sectors. 
Careless use of it risks masking its refractive effect.  
I t  i s  a  p o i n t  o f  f a c t  t h a t  r e f e rence to the concept in everyday 
conversation and in the mass media often takes on a symbolic value, 
becoming a magic formula which overlooks all reference to real 
phenomena.  
To try to give order to the discourse, we can point out some salient 
features, among many, which could be associated with the concept of 
flexibility and can be found in the concrete praxis of the management and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  w o r k .  A s  a n  e x a m p l e ,  w e  c a n  p o i n t  t o  t w o  o f  t h e m  i n  
particular: 
A)  The first is an objective, almost descriptive feature: that is to say, the 
polysemantic nature of the term, one which leaves a particular 
aftertaste of ambiguity. Reference to flexibility becomes more 
concrete when its meaning is functionally specified and inserted into a 
syntagm (see par. II below). 
B)  The second is of greater normative and evaluative value: current 
considerations, at least on the part of some scholars, in terms of 
redundancy, excess. Flexibility is homeopathic: if used in the right 
doses, it is an effective remedy, but one must not overdo it! And at 
times, as in the Italian situation – but this would mean anticipating 
the end of the story – flexibility  handled with lack of legislative 
caution, tending towards exaggeration, may cause more problems 
than it solves. 
A brief analysis of these two salient features of the concept will help to 
place the specific evolution of the concept of flexibility in Italian labour 
law in a general framework, which is the specific aim of this essay. 
 
I. Flexibility: three persons in one….  
  As we said, the term flexibility is often used to refer to policies 
inspired by different economic, cultural and ideological premises, and this 
contributes towards the rather ambiguous connotations it has come to 
feature
1. 
                                                 
1   Some authors have also shown the relativity of the concept: flexibility has different 
effects according to the context and type of work or worker it refers to. Cf. Gallino, THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 3
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With reference to theoretical studies on labour, in particular labour 
law, the concept is frequently associated with others, such as atypical 
work, casual workers, semi-independent workers, and others again such 
as deregulation, decentralisation, or privatisation
2. Analysis of these 
concepts is more or less explicitly conditioned by a sort of general 
understanding of the concept of flexibility on the part of the author, 
either stated or to be read between the lines. 
In short, the point is that the term flexibility has an extremely broad 
spectrum of reference and is difficult to place bounds on. With reference 
to labour law issues, it has been correlated not only with the labour 
market and standard forms of employment
3, but also with care work
4, 
and even the very concepts of collective representation
5, the carrying out 
and organisation of work in the public sector
6, and welfare (for example, 
the ways in which social security schemes are provided)
7.  
However, when used generically in connection with work, the term 
flexibility refers above all to clusters of issues concerning the regulation 
of employment relationships. Flexibility, as a concept, has indeed no 
uniformity or conceptual regularity: it only presupposes a common 
etymology  (coming from the Latin verb flectere – to bend or adapt), but 
the phenomena referring to the concept are several and various. As 
frequently encountered in sociological literature, there are at least five 
                                                                                                                              
L’idea di flessibilità sostenibile. Prospettive e problemi in rapporto a differenti modi di 
lavorare, Quaderni di sociologia, 2000, p. 111 and ff.. 
2   Fahlbeck, Flexibility: Potentials and challenges for Labor Law, Comparative Labor Law & 
Policy, 1998, p. 516; see also Fuchs in this volume 
3   For a broad survey of the Italian system, see Perulli, Interessi e tecniche di tutela nella 
disciplina del lavoro flessibile, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e relazioni industriali, 2002, 
3, p. 335. On the relationship between flexibility practices in labour and cultural 
variations in European countries, see Raghuram, London, Holt Larsen, Flexible 
employment practices in Europe: country versus culture, International Journal of Human 
Resource Management 2001, p. 738 and ff. 
4    Crompton, Employment, flexible working and the family, British Journal of Sociology, 
2002, p. 537 and ff.; Frey, Flessibilità del lavoro dal punto di vista dei lavoratori e 
conciliazione tra lavoro ed esigenze familiari, supplemento Quaderni di economia del 
lavoro 2002, 73, p. 1 and ff. 
5   Goslinga Sverke, Atypical Work and Trade Union Membership: Union Attitudes and Union 
Turnover among Traditional vs. Atypically Employed Union Members, Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, 2003, p. 290 and ff.; Leonardi, Lavoro flessibile e crisi della 
rappresentanza sociale del sindacato, Democrazia e diritto, 1999, p. 156 and ff.  
6   The debate in Italy has been very intense since the civil service employment reforms 
introduced in the ‘90s and the first years of this century. See D’Orta, Introduzione ad un 
ragionamento sulla flessibilità del lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni, Il lavoro nelle 
pubbliche amministrazioni, 2000, p. 515 and ff. 
7   Cinelli, Politiche dell’occupazione e flessibilità previdenziale, Rivista italiana di diritto del 
lavoro, 2000, I, p. 41.  4                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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types of flexibility in the sphere of labour  which can be considered 
syntagms worth analyzing and require different types of analysis:   
a)  Functional or organisational flexibility
8   
b)  Working hours flexibility 
c)  Wage flexibility 
These give rise to what is called internal flexibility in companies. 
Then we have: 
a)  Numerical flexibility 
b)  Geographical or territorial flexibility 
which give rise to external flexibility
9. 
We then have a kind of flexibility which is not autonomous, but which 
cuts across the other five rather than being a self-contained type. 
This is what sociologists define as normative flexibility, which concerns 
the capacity of legislation and contractual norms regulating employment 
and the labour market to adapt quickly to varying situations with 
acceptable re-adjustment costs.   
The problem raised by flexibility is not, however, only its polysemantic 
nature. It often refers to functions, policies and objectives that evoke, as 
said previously, a persistent, although not always evident, ambiguity. 
 In the dimension of economics, production and labour organisation, 
for example, the concept is entrusted with paradoxically opposing 
functions
10.   
                                                 
8   Kalleberg, Organizing flexibility: the Flexible Firm in a new century, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 2001, p. 479 and ff. Wilthagen, The Flexibility-Security Nexus: New 
approaches to regulating employment and labour markets, Flexicurity research paper 
FXP 2003, p. 6 and ff.  
9   In addition to the essay referred to in the previous note, see Kalleberg, Coinvolgimento 
e flessibilità: i cambiamenti delle relazioni di lavoro nelle società industriali, Sociologia 
del lavoro, 1990. p. 11 and ff. ; Fahlbeck op. cit. note 2; Michie/Sheehan, Labour 
market deregulation, ‘flexibility’ and innovation, Cambridge Journal of Economics 2003, 
p. 123 and ff. 
10    See the classical work by Regini,  Between Deregulation and Socia1 Pacts: The 
Responses of European Economies to Globalization, Politics and Society, 2000, p. 11 and 
ff. See also Modelli di capitalismo, Bari 2000, p. 17. For an approach which attempts to 
rationalise the apparent paradox of the coexistence in the same company of different 
types of flexibility (functional and numerical), see Reyneri, Flessibilità: molti significati, 
alcune contraddizioni, Sociologia del lavoro, 2003, p. 24: << European scholars have 
insisted on this contradiction in the attempt to show how Europe can cope with the new 
challenge of globalisation without upsetting their traditional economic system, largely 
based on functional flexibility. Maintaining that reliability and a high level of qualification 
can only be achieved by guaranteeing worker stability, high road economic growth, 
centring on sectors with a high added value, is opposed to a low road, confined to forms 
of production with a low level of technological or symbolic innovation. In reality, 
companies can respond to this contradiction by segmenting their workforce into a stable 
part, in which they can pursue a policy of functional flexibility, and a variable part, which 
allows for numerical flexibility. In this way, the stability of the fixed nucleus of workers THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 5
 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  39/2004 
 
 Flexibility is being used to try to: 
¾  increase competitiveness and productivity in enterprise even at 
the cost of increasing precarious employment  
¾  increase employment rates   
¾  also guarantee greater adaptability of work organization to the 
needs  of labour supply and, according to some, to guarantee 
greater security in that greater flexibility would orient companies 
towards awarding permanent contracts.  
These diverging functions are often connected to the dualism and 
segmentation of labour markets within a company
11. The different kinds 
of flexibility are said to be suitable for different groups of workers 
employed by the same company; functional flexibility, which implies a   
multi-skilled and adaptive workforce   and loyalty-promoting strategies 
including training processes, applies to stable workers. Numerical 
flexibility applies to temporary workers taken on with different kinds of 
fixed-term contract.  As has been pointed out 
12, however, these 
generalising explanations do not solve the objective contradictions and 
ambiguities of the concept when referred to real phenomena.  
  It is, in fact, well known to all that squaring the circle of 
competitiveness, job security, employment standards and the attempt to 
increase employment rates is an arduous task
13. The magic formula of 
flexibility is useful here: it is used to explain and reconcile everything, but 
it is, after all, only a magic formula which may well not work. It therefore 
seems worth decoding, destructuring; methodologically, it is of greater 
significance to investigate the concrete labour policies and far-reaching 
regulatory strategies that are being applied or intended for application, 
behind the somewhat mystifying veil of the concept of flexibility. The 
attempt to do so will be made by following the historical development of 
the labour law system in Italy. 
 
II. Redundant flexibility 
The obsessive use of the concept of flexibility often encountered in 
public debate is in a sense connected with a phenomenon observed by 
sociologists in analysing how flexibility operates in concrete labour 
organisation practice.  
                                                                                                                              
considered to be strategic comes to depend on the presence of a “variable geometry” 
periphery” >>. See also Kallenberg, op. cit. note 7. 
11 Deakin/Reed, The Contested Meaning of Labour Market Flexibility, in J. Shaw (ed), Social 
Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union, Oxford 2000, p. 77. 
12   Above all, Reyneri op. cit. in previous note and Kalleberg op. cit. in note 8. 
13   With reference to part time work, see essays by Lo Faro and Schmidt in this volume. 6                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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 In the strategies employed by companies, as we said, the recourse to 
flexibility and the actions connected with it is, in certain respects, 
undoubtedly useful; in others, it indicates an exaggeration, an excess of 
both concern and legislative measures, which are not having very positive 
effects. 
This excess of business practice and labour policies inspired by 
flexibility has been defined as redundant systemic flexibility 
14. 
 The concept can be better explained as follows:  in any environment 
where material or non-material production factors, including human 
resources, are organised, flexible management techniques appear 
nowadays to be indispensable in order to achieve objectives such as good 
performance, efficiency, effectiveness, profitability and success.  
This is due to economic, social and cultural factors that cannot be 
dwelt on here. 
It appears, however, to be a general fact that we have passed from an 
excess of rigidity in organisation and management - which was typical of 
the Fordist social and production model (in the 60s and 70s) - to an 
excess of flexibility, which is at times useless and economically 
expensive, as well as harmful from a social and human viewpoint 
15. 
When companies, instead of focusin g  o n  a n  a d e q u a t e  c a p a c i t y  t o  
foresee economic events and thus adapt their organisation accordingly, 
lay everything on a surplus of organisation and flexible labour, and 
transform this requirement into a claim for changes in legislation in the 
direction of deregulation, the flexibility introduced is redundant, that is, 
there is an unnecessary amount of flexibility or it becomes an end in 
itself.  
This abstract line of reasoning can be applied to labour law. The idea 
of mild, sustainable flexibility, flexisecurity and adaptability, (as flexibility 
is referred to in the jargon of the European Employment Strategy) refers 
to a widespread necessity which is being transformed – in various ways 
and guises according to the national context – into concrete policies and 
new visible, ordered ways of regulating labour. The commendable 
attempt is to trigger off a drive towards convergence, although in 
different ways, on a sort of ideal, still mobile, boundary between social-
                                                 
14   Cerruti, Incertezza, flessibilità e sicurezza sociale del lavoro, Assistenza sociale, 2000, p. 
58. 
15  The reference is to the school of sociological and economic thought that adopts a critical 
stand towards globalisation and its effects in terms of insecurity and precariousness in 
the workplace and society in general: in this approach flexibility and precariousness are 
considered to be almost synonymous. Cf. Gallino, Il costo umano della flessibilità, Bari 
2001; Beck, Il lavoro nell’epoca della fine del lavoro: tramonto delle sicurezze e nuovo 
impegno civile, Torino 2000; Sennet, L’uomo flessibile, Milano 2000; Bauman, La società 
dell’incertezza, Bologna 1999.   THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 7
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oriented flexibility on one side, and useful flexibility, in economic and 
organisational terms, on the other.  
How this is to be achieved and which institutions are to act as the 
driving force (European, national, regional or local) remains a 
controversial topic of debate
16.  
To follow the line of this debate and assess the results of the search 
for the philosopher’s stone (flexibility combined with security), reference 
will be made to the evolution of the Italian system, evaluating whether 
recent developments have taken this direction. The analysis will focus in 
particular on the diachronic evolution of the concept and the way it has 
been used to justify legislative policies that diverge from traditional ones 
of a redistributive type. To this end, the paradigm of flexibility will be 
considered without particular specifications. The differentiation between 
the various functions of flexibility referred to above (§ 1.1.) will only 
emerge in relation to concrete examples of the techniques and regulatory 
measures adopted in the framework of this paradigm.  
In the final part of the essay, the Italian situation and its most recent 
developments will be projected against the European scenario. It is, in 
fact, at this level that the drive towards a convergence that is capable of 
avoiding redundant, excessive flexibility finds its theoretical expression in 
the concept of flexibility combined with security.  
 
§ 2: Stages in the evolution of labour law in Italy in the 
wake of the flexibility paradigm    
Like a virus, the concept of flexibility was inoculated into Italian 
scientific debate and concrete regulatory strategies from the outside, in 
the early ‘80s, and came from other, healthy-carrier disciplines that were 
much more familiar with it: economics, organisational science and 
sociology. But as we shall see, once inoculated into the organism of 
labour law, which is notoriously receptive and at times devoid of 
antibodies, it took root and began to multiply and spread, ending up by 
conditioning its identity. 
  The concept of flexibility is, then, a relatively new one for Italian 
labour law as a science. The concept has none of the evocative features 
of its modern identity, as constructed and consolidated above all in 
                                                 
16 Cf. Caruso, Decentralised Social Pacts, Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining, WP 
CSDLE Massimo D’Antona, 2002, 2, 
http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/ricerca/wp/n2_caruso.pdf , also in Biagi (ed), Towards 
a European Model of Industrial Relations? Building on the First Report of the European 
Commission, Kluwer 2001. 8                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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Continental Europe in at least two-thirds of the short century: it has 
nothing to do, for example, with concepts like collective interests, 
solidarity, coalition, the favour principle, etc., which evoke quite the 
opposite, that is, rigid, uniform regulatory mechanisms.  
I. Flexibility as a stigma (the ‘70s)  
In the first phase, flexibility was considered practically as a stigma, not 
only in theoretical debate but also in regulatory policies, both legal and 
contractual. 
Post-Constitutional labour law in Italy took on its current 
physiognomy, characterised by the stereotype of excessive support for   
individual social rights, and thus rigidity, in the 1970s with the Workers' 
Statute (which was in effect a law implementing the principles laid down 
by the Constitution in 1948). 
This model of legislation aimed at combining support for the most 
representative trade union organisations and collective bargaining on the 
one hand and legislative reinforcement of guarantees and individual 
employment rights on the other. The result was excessive normative 
rigidity, which went well beyond the intentions of legislators at that time. 
This was due to a combination of various factors which were not 
strategically connected but which ultimately converged, resulting in a 
highly protective and rigid system (as regards both individual and 
collective employment relations). 
This result was in part due to the legislative technique adopted, based 
on what are called non-derogatory and mandatory provisions. It was, 
however, also due to an accumulated flood of further legislation 
guaranteeing individual rights. 
The new guarantees introduced by the Workers' Statute in 1970 
neither substituted nor were co-ordinated with the protective norms laid 
down by the Civil Code in 1942. These, in fact, were still in force, despite 
the fall of the corporative regime, because they were inspired by an 
ideology of individual paternalism (the favour principle) that was 
considered to be compatible with the new values of social solidarity 
enshrined in the Constitution.   
The new guarantees were not even co-ordinated with those deriving 
from the first wave of protective legislation introduced in the ‘60s 
(concerning fixed-term contracts
17 and banning work subcontracting) to 
counteract the excessive laissez-faire attitude of the ‘50s. The result was 
                                                 
17   See essay by Zappalà in this volume. THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 9
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an excess of worker protection and rigidity caused by the uncoordinated 
sedimentation of various protection strategies
18.   
To this must be added the efforts made by collective bargaining in the 
‘70s to strengthen individual worker protection by means of provisions 
which often represented an improvement on the minimum terms 
provided for by law, and the fact that a large cross-section of the labour 
courts were ideologically inclined to interpret this flood of legislative 
measures in a pro-labour sense.  
This historical phase of Italian labour law can well be defined as one of 
ideological stigmatisation of flexibility, and corresponded to an extremely 
rigid regulation of labour law, all in favour of the worker and trade 
unions. 
    What is important to point out is that in the Italian debate this 
stigmatisation of the concept of flexibility corresponded to the 
strengthening of a conflicting concept which was to find great favour in 
the vocabulary of European law scholars: the concept of 
“inderogability”
19. 
The concept can be seen as one of the most original products (made in 
Italy but with strong Germanic reminiscences)
20 by the science of labour 
law and was also recognised as a key concept by law scholars from a 
different cultural tradition such as Lord Wedderburn, who introduced it 
into Anglo-Saxon culture where it was as yet unknown
21. It also 
influenced labour law theory in Spain, leading to the reforms introduced 
in the post-Franco Constitutional era. 
In the language of labour law experts the concept of inderogability 
came to mean a regulatory technique both of  law and collective contracts 
that produced uniformity and rigidity in protective treatment which at 
                                                 
18   See the seminal essay by Giugni, Il diritto del lavoro negli anni ’80, Giornale di diritto del 
lavoro e relazioni industriali, 1982, p. 373 and ff. 
19   “The concept of inderogability means that the legal system prohibits the two parties in 
an employment relationship from individually negotiating terms of employment that are 
worse than those laid down by law or a collective contract: a worker is not allowed, for 
example, to accept a salary lower than the collective one, or less protection against the 
risk of dismissal. Italian labour law theory – irrespective of its political orientation – has 
always considered this rule, which goes back to the broader concept of « social public 
order », to be an essential part of all labour legislation”: A. & P. Ichino, A chi serve il 
diritto del lavoro. Riflessioni interdisciplinari sulla funzione economica e la giustificazione 
costituzione dell’inderogabilità delle norme giuslavoriste, Rivista italiana di diritto del 
lavoro, 1994, I, p. 461 . Cf. the seminal book by De Luca Tamajo, La norma inderogabile 
nel diritto del lavoro, Napoli 1976. 
20   Of fundamental importance to Italian labour law culture is Vardaro, Contratti collettivi e 
rapporto individuale di lavoro”, Milano 1985. 
21   Wedderburn, Inderogability, collective agreements and Community Law”, Industrial Law 
Journal 1992, p. 245. 10                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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times contrasted with the wishes of the partners to individual contracts, 
even those of employees in permanent jobs. But it went even further. 
Inderogability was not only considered to be a contingent regulatory 
technique implying protective contents. It was also presented as one of a 
number of reference concepts through which labour law asserted its 
autonomy, rebelling against the hegemony of contract law and the civil 
code and the related regulatory techniques and provisions. Inderogability 
was a privileged, or rather unique, regulatory technique through which 
collective autonomy asserted its social and existential programme vis à 
vis individual contractual autonomy (and the related mystifications), to 
the extent that it colonised, as was to be stated later, the whole sphere 
of labour 
22.       
  In this context, the concept of inderogability took on a symbolic 
valence (often being connected with the principle of substantial equality) 
as well as an ideological one. It was for a long time to represent (and in 
the opinion of some, still represents
 23) the autonomy and pre-eminence 
of labour law and its reference values (protection, solidarity, equality, 
emancipation) over those of contract and the market (individualism, 
competitiveness, meritocracy). 
II. Flexibility as a necessary evil (the '80s) 
The second stage in the evolution of the flexibility debate in Italy, and 
in negotiated or State-introduced regulation, can be called “flexibility as a 
necessary evil”. The economic crisis and the oil slump in the mid-70s, 
high inflation rates, the loss of competitiveness by enterprise, 
compensated for less and less by devaluation of the Italian lira, as well as 
political reasons (the frighteningly unknown variable of far left-wing 
terrorism, the defeat of trade unions in the Fiat company) showed that 
the situation was unsustainable, even for labour law. 
                                                 
22   See essays by La giuridificazione di rapporti di lavoro, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e 
relazioni industriali, 1986, p. 215; id., Il diritto del lavoro e la riscoperta dell’individuo, 
Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 1990, p. 87 and ff. In general 
regarding formation of the cultural identity of labour law, see Supiot The Dogmatic 
Foundations of the Market (Comments illustrated by some examples from labour law and 
social security law), Industrial Law Journal, 2000, p. 321; Romagnoli, Il lavoro in Italia: 
un giurista racconta, Bologna 1995. 
23    See essay by Fontana in this volume, and Delfino, ll diritto del lavoro comunitario e 
italiano fra inderogabilità e soft law, Diritti lavori mercati, 2003, p. 653; Novella, 
Considerazioni sul regime della norma inderogabile nel diritto del lavoro, in Argomenti di 
diritto del lavoro, 2003, p. 509 and ff. For a critique of the concept and function of 
inderogable norms in labour law founded on the postulates of economic legal analysis, 
see A. & P. Ichino, op. cit. in note 19.  THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 11
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In the early ’80s even an eminent labour law scholar like Gino Giugni, 
who was emphatically considered to be the father of the Workers' Statute 
and thus one of the architects of the protective legislation, caught the cry 
of pain from the world of enterprise and warned of the dangers of the 
excessive rigidity of the Italian system
24.  
 Needless to say, the  80s were the years which saw the triumph of a 
neo-laissez-faire ideology and, in certain countries, policies inspired by 
this ideology. 
In Italy this was not the case: on the contrary, for the first time 
experiments were carried out with legislative concertation, by means of 
great trilateral agreements between trade unions, the government and 
associations of entrepreneurs.  
The result was the introduction of a certain dose of flexibility in the 
regulatory system. It was achieved via legislation, but with the consent of 
the trade unions.   
The reform of fixed-term contracts
25 (in the sense that companies 
were allowed greater recourse to them), the first regulations supporting  
part-time work
26, the introduction of solidarity contracts, work and 
training contracts, the possibility for companies to take on workers by 
name
27, that is, to choose them directly without being forced by an 
automatic selection procedure to choose them from lists bureaucratically 
and inefficiently administered by State work placement offices; and also 
concessions regarding functional flexibility via collective bargaining: these 
were all the results of this phase.  Rigidity is still the rule: flexibility is an 
exception, but it exists. 
Three different legislative techniques were used to introduce some 
doses of flexibility into the system: a) the rigidity of some provisions was 
loosened, creating new exceptions (as in the case of fixed-term contracts 
and training contracts); b) collective bargaining was empowered to 
modulate the amount of flexibility in some specific topics ; c) in some 
cases established by law collective bargaining  was allowed to derogate in 
peius from legal provisions previously considered to be inderogable, but 
only as a temporary, transitory measure (the function being to combat 
the economic crisis).   
 Two reasons which made this injection of doses of flexibility into the 
system politically possible must be stressed: in exchange for concessions 
regarding flexibility, the trade unions obtained two important political 
                                                 
24   See essay referred to in note18.  
25  See essay by Zappalà in this volume. 
26  See essay by Lo Faro in this volume 
27   Name-based appointments were fully liberalised by Law 223/1991. See essay by Bonura 
in this volume. 12                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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advantages. The first came directly from the government in the form of 
state resources for welfare policies and passive labour market policies, 
substantially as income support for workers involved in company crises 
(unemployment benefits and early retirement).  
This, however, was also advantageous for companies: in exchange for 
limited doses of flexibility (much lower than expected or hoped for), they 
obtained State financial support for processes of restructuring and re-
conversion that involved collective dismissals. Secondly, the trade unions 
were persuaded to accept the new forms of flexibility by the fact that the 
relevant legislation did not adopt the technique of cut-and-dried 
deregulation. 
The flexibility was, on the contrary, a result of various different 
s t r a t e g i e s  o f  n e g o t i a t e d  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  m o s t  o f  t h e m  c o n v e r g i n g  o n  t h e  
common aim of involving trade unions in the process of conferring 
greater flexibility on laws previously considered to be mandatory, by 
means of recourse to collective contracts, but also regulating new types 
of contract (for example, part-time contracts).   
In short, companies could obtain greater flexibility within the limits 
expressly contemplated by the new regulations, but only if authorised by 
the administrative authorities, or alternatively by means of formal 
consent in the form of agreements with the most representative trade 
unions: that is, on a case-by-case basis. 
So in this phase the ideological attitude which generally stigmatised 
flexibility did not change; but the government and the trade unions 
recognised that a certain dose of flexibility was inevitable, above all when 
the industrial system was sending out worrying alarm signals. 
The change as compared with the previous “stigma” phase is indicative 
of the evolution of the concepts involved: the concept of inderogability as 
an absolutely untouchable technique and value declined. Labour 
protection could, if necessary, be bent and reconciled with other interests 
to cope with a turbulent labour market, restructuring, the economic crisis 
and the new post-Fordist models of production that were beginning to be 
introduced (flexible specialisation)
28. 
And this was done in the name of a “lesser God”: flexibility. But these 
processes were to be rigorously governed by the bargaining power of the 
trade unions; indeed, this power was strengthened to the extent that it 
played a significant role in canonical policy-making: the process of 
drawing up laws (negotiated legislation).    This tacit institutional pact 
behind the system of industrial relations (which did not become 
institutionalised in Italy with the same solidity as in Spain or Austria for 
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example) was honoured by all governments during the ‘80s towards all 
trade unions, with very few exceptions (for instance, the wage sliding 
scale issue in 1984). 
As far as regulatory techniques are concerned, the consequences were 
just as evident: the increasingly frequent reference to flexibility as a 
necessary evil did not lead to processes of deregulation or the 
dismantling of legislation supporting the most representative trade 
unions. Quite the opposite; it led to re-regulation by transferring 
responsibility previously held directly by the law to collective bargaining 
by the most representative trade unions even on issues directly involving 
public assets: not only the labour market, for example, but also the 
management of social security and unemployment benefits.  
At this stage, however, flexibility was not considered intrinsic to the 
labour law paradigm, but an external functional and contingent response 
to a critical situation in the labour market (hence the category of 
“emergency labour law”);  its impact on the traditional regulatory basis  
of labour law was not considered to be very great and, in any case, 
temporary and transitory. 
III. Flexibility as an objective necessity (the 90s) 
In the ‘90s the picture changes considerably. International 
competition, the transformation of the economy and the technological 
and digital revolution impressed the need for flexibility as an objective 
necessity rather than a necessary evil, even in the minds of the most 
reluctant observers. The reorganisation of companies and the economy 
required much higher levels of flexibility than in the past, not least 
because the protective legislation was often bypassed, either in fact (by 
means of a dramatic spread of the shadow economy in Italy
29) or by 
derogation through pacts and agreements at a company, local or 
territorial level. 
The law itself radically changed its attitude: what had previously been 
stigmatised was now accepted; despite signs to the contrary from the 
Constitutional Court
30, it was accepted by labour Courts, for example, 
that standard employment was no longer the great sun that attracted all 
                                                 
29   The most recent data supplied by Istat on trends in the shadow economy in Italy are 
dated December 23, 2003 and are as follows: 
Rate of irregular workforce members (Source: Istat) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
14,5% 14,5% 14,8% 15,1% 15,0% 15,0% 15,3% 
 
30   Corte Cost. n° 115/1994. See essay by Fontana in this volume. Also D’Antona, Limiti 
costituzionali alla disponibilità del tipo contrattuale nel diritto del lavoro, Argomenti di 
Diritto del Lavoro, 1995, p. 63 and ff. 14                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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the planets in the system (as it had done during the Fordist era), but just 
one of many stars of equal rank (if anything, it was diminishing in size). 
It was, in fact, in the labour market and in what was called flexibility in 
first-time employment (the aim being to provide incentives for hiring 
workers) that the most significant systemic changes were made. Various 
legislative reforms were introduced.  
Thanks to the slackening of juridical interpretation, as mentioned 
previously, the legislative reforms in the 90s directly or indirectly 
promoted the spread of various forms of employment involving greater 
transversal normative flexibility (which in various ways and to greater or 
lesser degrees affected working hours, pay, job security and so on). 
It is worthwhile giving a few examples to make the meaning clearer. 
In the early ‘90s a concerted agreement (the Ciampi protocol) 
eliminated the sliding scale, which rigidly and automatically protected 
wages from the effects of inflation. Since then the income policy in Italy 
(which has no familiarity with the American model of unilateral wage 
flexibility) has depended on macro-economic variables which are to a 
certain extent extraneous to the system of wage agreements: it depends 
above all on the constraints of the single currency and the concerted 
income policy; at the medium-higher levels of workers (managers and 
executives) there is a considerable wage drift steered by individual 
contracts. 
 In the ’90s working hours were made much more flexible due to the 
combined effects of legislative reforms complying with EU directives and 
collective bargaining
31. Legislators also provided stronger support for 
part-time work than before, even though the logic behind this policy 
combined trade union control and the  need for flexibility on the part of 
both workers and companies
32. 
 
  1. The 90s (continued):  the "more flexibility, less unemployment" 
connection.       
 
 The rush to legitimise flexibility as a new labour law paradigm - and 
not only as a necessary but temporary evil or objective necessity - 
continued in this period with implicitly pro-union governments like the 
“technical” governments of the early ‘90s  and the openly pro-union 
centre-left governments of the second half of the decade. The Italian 
social model based on development of the productivity of labour featuring 
a very limited work activity rate (due to atavistic economic and social 
                                                 
31   See essay by Ricci in this volume.  
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reasons which cannot be dealt with here) required acceptance of 
modifications to the labour law system with the aim of promoting 
employment, seen as an urgent priority. 
The change therefore took place for functional reasons: even reformist 
labour law experts accepted in principle the dominating more-flexibility- 
less-unemployment connection. The furthest-reaching, if not the most 
rationally co-ordinated, reforms introduced in the '90s concerned 
flexibility in first-time employment.    
  The labour legislation introduced in the ’90s contained many new 
types of flexible work contracts, all aiming at increasing employment; 
some were already common in other systems (such as temporary work 
through agencies); others were typically Italian (“stage” contracts, "social 
utility work", work scholarships, professional retraining schemes, 
contracts for continuous and co-ordinated but not permanent work). 
  They are contingent work contracts which are still stereotyped as 
atypical, but the statistics concerning the growing recourse to them make 
nonsense of such a definition
33. As official statistics demonstrate
34 , these 
types of contract have definitely contributed towards a remarkable 
increase in the percentage of flexible work in the Italian labour market as 
compared with steady employment (although not to the same extent as 
in other European countries); and they have also contributed to the 
increase in the employment rate in the last few years (although other 
factors must also have played an important role, given the unexpected 
recent increase in traditional permanent employment as well, but before 
the present economic slump). 
The social effects of this spread of flexible contracts are, however, as 
evident as the economic effects:  
a)  Greater accent has definitely been placed on the multi-tier internal 
labour market
35 (i.e. workers with standard contracts and those 
                                                 
33    For the similar evolution of the labour market in France cf. Théry, Nuove forme di 
lavoro: flessibilità e sicurezza, Sociologia del lavoro, 1998 p. 103 and ff.  
34   For an analysis, albeit not very recent, see The growth of flexible work , Italy, European 
Industrial Relations Review, 2000, 315, 31. For more recent data, see Table 1 in 
Appendix. 
35    The multi-tier configuration of the labour market within companies, and not one in 
merely dualistic terms, is probably more realistic as it takes account of the complexity of 
outsourcing strategies adopted: alongside permanent employees who make up the 
organic “core” (insiders) there are various categories of outsiders: steady external 
workers (e.g. those working on a continuous, coordinated but not permanent contract, 
others working on a continuous consultative basis, contracted or subcontracted workers 
who are permanently inserted into the production cycle of the contracting firm, and 
workers on a permanent contract); but there are also temporary outside workers (doing 
occasional, accessory, or on-call fixed-term work, to use the terminology used in the 16                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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taken on with the new forms of contract, who may or may not 
have  job security, particularly in what is called contingent 
work)
36.  
b)  But there has also been a shift in the mobile borderline between 
flexibility and job instability and precariousness, with a marked 
prevalence of the latter. 
It is as if Italian labour law in the ’90s, although it did not declare so 
openly, had become aware of the social plurality of types of employment; 
and although no radical reforms were brought in, it is as if it had 
introduced a diversification in the relative juridical regimes. What are the 
consequences of this prospect as far as the theory and functions of labour 
law are concerned? 
At this stage, flexibility is no longer considered to be a stigma, a 
necessary evil, or an objective necessity: it has become a new theoretical 
horizon to refer to in adapting labour law and its regulatory techniques to 
new, broader institutional strategies and functions. The flexibility 
paradigm is this legitimised as a new theoretical horizon for labour law; 
the problem that remains is how to adapt it so that it can coexist with the 
much more legitimised paradigm of the traditional Italian labour law 
system, that is, job security and permanence, which is considered to by 
the ideal, universal model of social protection.    
  Taken as a whole, the provisions introduced in the ’90s were not 
simply an injection of further doses of flexibility, but a real systemic 
transformation due to the variability of labour law worker protection 
regimes.  
The phenomenon of an increasing n u m b e r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  
employment contract, hitherto viewed as a sort of departure from labour 
law (in the sense that labour law was identified with standard forms of 
employment), is credited with a positive, functional broadening of its 
regulatory confines. The labour law domain extends to work sans phrase, 
not through the traditional “imperial” expansionistic technique of applying 
the whole apparatus of worker protection in permanent employment to 
other types of contract, but rather through acceptance of the theorem of 
regulatory differentiation between protection regimes. Social pluralism is 
                                                                                                                              
recent reform introduced in Italy by the Berlusconi government: Legislative Decree 
276/03).  
36 For an analysis referring above all to self-employed workers, see Barbieri, Liberi di 
rischiare. Vecchi e nuovi lavoratori autonomi, Stato e mercato, 1999, p. 281 and ff. I 
cerchi concentrici. Discussion about contingent work is frequent in American literature: 
see Barker, Christensen, Lautsh, Income and Social Security and Substandard Working 
Conditions Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition, Ithaca, 
1998; Stone, From Widget to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing 
Workplace, Cambridge, CUP, 2004. THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 17
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accepted by labour law, but this acceptance marks a profound 
transformation, a crisis affecting its original, monolithic identity
37. 
Work sans phrase still merits protection, but with more flexible, 
sophisticated techniques than the traditional inderogability. These 
techniques also presuppose worker protection on the labour market and 
not only in the employment relationship
38; promotional protection in the 
job-seeking stage or in passing from one job to another; proactive, at 
times, soft techniques, the aim of which is also self-promotion by the 
worker: what in Community jargon is called employability.  
On the basis of the EES which began to influence labour policy and 
debate in Italy above all from the late 90s onwards, there is a widespread 
conviction that forms and techniques of protection do not necessarily 
have to be borrowed from standard permanent employment, but can be 
gradually adapted to specific types of work.   The law does not directly 
regulate this adaptation, nor does it provide indications as to other 
sources of regulation. It confines itself to legitimising them, renouncing 
its regulatory predominance. It does so by amplifying the scope of 
regulation via collective contracts, but recognises a new role for individual 
agreements and wishes, providing they are within the bounds and under 
the protective umbrella of collective autonomy, as is the case with the 
new regulations governing part-time work
39. The several concurrent 
sources refer back to each other in an articulated play of mirrors (one 
reflecting the other) and the regulatory framework is apparently 
                                                 
37 Caruso, The future of labour law: traditional models of social protection and a new   
constitution of social rights WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" N. 10/2002, 
http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/ricerca/wp/default.htm 
38    Of great and undoubted influence in Italy was the work carried out by the group 
coordinated by Supiot, Au-delà de l’emploi (transformations du travail et devenir du 
droit du travail in Europe), Flammarion, Paris 1999.   
39   See essay by Lo Faro in this volume. Legislation in the ‘90s which legitimised individual 
contracts to introduce doses of flexibility into the system was based on theoretical 
indications from Italian experts supporting innovation in a context of continuity and fully 
aware of criticism about the colonising effects of classical labour law on several spheres 
of life: cf., D’Antona ,  Contrattazione collettiva e autonomia individuale nei rapporti di 
lavoro atipico, Giornale diritto del lavoro e relazioni industriali, 1990, n. 47, p. 529 ff., 
now in Opere, Caruso/Sciarra (eds.), I, Milano 2000, p. 75 ff. A limited precedent to the 
part-time reform introduced in 2000 (Legislative Decree 61) can be seen in the civil 
service reform, which granted public administration executives the power, albeit greatly 
limited by collective bargaining, to negotiate their salaries individually;  see Nicosia, La 
dirigenza statale tra fiducia, buona fede ed interessi pubblici, Giornale di diritto del 
lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 2003, p. 253 and ff. Here, however, the reasoning 
behind the law was not to provide a safety net for individual autonomy, but to guarantee 
trade union control against the risk of an excessive wage drift, with probable 
repercussions on the public expenditure. 18                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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complicated
40: but regulatory complexity is probably the price that has to 
be paid to prevent labour law from falling into the regulatory dilemma 
discussed by Teubner
41. 
Despite its uncertainties, timidity and not always acceptable technical 
solution, this legislation represents a new form of experimentalism, with 
interference from sources and techniques of protection that are different 
from the traditional ones attributable to labour law. Work relationships 
can also be regulated by individual contracts, but the worker’s wishes are 
“protected” by a collective source which provides a framework of 
certainties and limits to individual bargaining: a sort of safety net against 
voracity and unilaterality on the part of employers. 
This short season represented the embryo, in the Italian system, of 
the new paradigm of flexicurity which had already taken root successfully 
in other European countries (above all in Holland and, with certain 
differences, Denmark
42). This experience found an institutional reference 
in the so-called “third way” that Europe was trying to experiment with the 
pillar of adaptability in employment policies
43. In Italy at that time, 
                                                 
40    The most frequent criticism of the part-time reform introduced in 2000 (Legislative 
Decree 61) to implement the EU directive, as expressed in the White Paper issued by the 
Berlusconi government, was that the regulations were muddled and uselessly 
complicated, not least due to the intricate, but probably integrating, involvement of 
several sources of regulation. 
41    This can be summarised as follows: incongruence between law and society as a 
consequence of which legal regulation remains ineffective because it does not produce 
any change in practice; that is, hyperlegalisation of the social system, synonymous with 
Habermasian colonisation; or, hypersocialisation of the legal system, leading to its being 
instrumentalised by politics or the sectors being regulated. Cf. Teubner ,  After Legal 
Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law , in Dilemmas of Law in the 
Welfare State. ed. by Teubner, Berlin 1986. 
42 As is known, there are basically two models based on the flexicurity paradigm: the Dutch 
model, which focuses on compensating flexibility and security in employment, with 
particular reference to atypical forms of work; an the Danish model, where a high 
degree of flexibility (in all types of employment) is compensated for by great preotecton 
and social subsidies on the labour market. For a comparative analysis, see Wilthagen, 
Tros, van Lieshout, Towards “flexicurity”? Balancing flexibility and security in EU 
member states, Flexicurity research paper FXP 2003 – 3. For further references to the 
two models, see Wilthagen and Rogowski, ‘Legal Regulation of Transitional Labour 
Markets’,    Schmid/Gazier, eds. , The Dynamics of Full Employment: Social Integration 
through Transitional Labour Markets, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar,  2002, p. 245 and ff. 
Reference to the two models is also made in the recent Kok report, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, 
Creating more employment in Europe , Report of the Employment Taskforce, chaired by 
Wim Kok, p. 28. Available on Labour Web 
http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/documentazione/altridoc/jobs.pdf 
43   For a critical stance, see Ashiagbor, “Flexibility” and “adaptability in the EU employment 
strategy, in Collins, Davies, Rideout, (ed.), Legal regulation of the employment relation, 
London, 2000, p. 373; a more positive judgement is given by Kenner, The EC 
Employment title and the “third way”:  Making soft law at work, The International THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 19
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however, there was a lack of awareness of the need for the coexistence 
of all the elements necessary to qualify a labour policy as being inspired 
by the paradigm of flexicurity, as indicated by the most successful 
experience, that is, in Holland. In particular these involve the 
synchronisation and coordination of measures aiming to introduce 
flexibility into the labour market and employment; but they also include 
social security reform to increase security on the job market, and 
reasonable coordination between legislative reforms and deregulated 
bargaining policies based on multilevel governance, as presupposed by 
the flexicurity policy 
44. In short, the season of reforms did not have the 
strength to implement much-needed systemic reforms, in the framework 
of a far-reaching cultural project aiming at “re-institutionalising the 
employment relationship which would be achieved by setting rules, 
allocating negotiating forums for these rules and enabling collective 
actors to intervene effectively”, according to the lines of the Supiot 
report. A project that would be able not only to reconcile but also 
systemically integrate freedom, flexibility and the need for security
45. 
A sign of these limits is the so-called Christmas Pact, signed on 
December 22, 1998 by the social partners and the government, in which 
the chapter on labour market and employment relationship reforms 
remained empty. Without clear, unambiguous institutional and normative 
points of reference, even the season of decentralised territorial pacts, 
which was perhaps the most significant step in the direction of flexicurity 
in Italy, remained fruitless and was destined to end
46.   
Little remains of that season beyond a few sporadic, fragmentary 
norms based on the paradigm: there has been no coordinated, structured 
                                                                                                                              
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1999, p. 99 and Caruso, 
Alla ricerca della flessibilità “mite”: il terzo pilastro delle politiche del lavoro comunitarie, 
Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 2000, p.141.  
44  Wilthagen and Rogowski, ‘Legal Regulation of Transitional Labour Markets’, cit. in note 
42. Note p.250, flexicurity <<represents a policy concept or, more specifically, a policy 
strategy that can be defined as follows: ‘a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically 
and in a coordinated way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation 
and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employment security 
and social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside the labour market on the 
other hand’. For a detailed analysis of the flexicurity paradigm, see Wilthagen The 
Flexibility-Security Nexus: New approaches to regulating employment and labour 
markets, Flexicurity research paper FXP 2003 – 2, and   Wilthagen, Flexicurity: A New 
Paradigm for Labour Market Policy Reform?, 1998, Flexicurity Research Programme 
FXPaper Nr. 1. 
45   Supiot, Casas, de Munk, Hanan, Johansson, Meadows, Mingione, Salais van der Heijden, 
Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe, Oxford 
2001, p. 45. 
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policy induced by mutual reliance between the political and social actors 
on which to build partnership practices that are deep-rooted enough to 
become vectors of solid structural reforms in the name of flexicurity 
47 .  
Traces of the paradigm can be seen in the part-time reform introduced 
in 2000 (Legislative Decree 61/00), where the law tried, as mentioned 
previously, to give the individual partners responsibility for establishing 
sustainable degrees of flexibility that were reconcilable with the personal 
needs of the workers involved. This is achieved by recourse to measures 
regulating consensual agreement on the duration and flexibility of 
working hours, legitimising this possibility but within a network of 
protection guaranteed by collective bargaining, and entitling the worker 
to “change his mind” about his terms of employment
48. There are also 
some traces in regulations governing temporary agency contracts (Law 
196/97), which require temporary workers to be afforded the same 
treatment as workers permanently employed by the company and 
establish significant training obligations on the part of the temporary 
employment agency
49.  
Also linked to the paradigm is the slow but progressive consolidation of 
a minimal set of measures to protect workers on coordinated, continuous, 
but not permanent contracts which, together with subcontracting, 
                                                 
47   The fiduciary element as a salient political factor in governance based on flexicurity is 
convincingly emphasised by Wilthagen, The Flexibility-Security Nexus, cit. note 8, p. 25 
and ff. 
48   On the part-time reform in Italy under governments belonging to the Olive Tree alliance, 
see Lo Faro in this volume, as well as Liso (ed), Il lavoro a tempo parziale, Roma 2002, 
and the essays it includes. However, even in the case of part-time work, changes in the 
name of flexicurity did not achieve the organic nature of the Dutch regulations: see 
Wilthagen, Tros, van Lieshout, Towards “flexicurity”? cit. note 42, p. 18 and Wilthagen 
and Rogowski,   ‘Legal Regulation of Transitional Labour Markets’, op. cit. note 44. p. 
246. Although Italian legislation is in certain respects similar, it does not provide 
measures like that of the Dutch civil code which expressly prohibits discriminatory 
financial or legal treatment of workers regarding the amount of time devoted to work, 
nor is there anything similar to the Dutch Working Act of 2000, which allows a worker to 
reduce or increase his working hours unilaterally, in relation to his personal needs, a 
possibility that is only precluded if an employer can demonstrate that “major corporate 
or organizational interests’ are likely to be adversely affected”, ivi p. 245 and note 12. 
Similar measures only apply to public administration. 
49  Cf. Liso, Carabelli (eds.)  Il lavoro temporaneo. Commento alla l. n. 196/1997, Milano, 
1999, p. 33 and ff.  Carinci M.T., La fornitura di lavoro altrui. Art. 2127, in Schlesinger 
(directed by) Il codice civile. Commentario, Milano 2000. From the perspective outlined 
above, see especially Zappalà, La “flessibilità nella sicurezza” alla prova. Il caso del 
lavoro temporaneo fra soft e hard law, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni 
industriali, 2003, p. 69. The Italian reform, however, has nothing to compare with the 
articulated balance between flexibility and security in agency work achieved by the 
Dutch legislation, cf. Wilthagen, Flexicurity: A New Paradigm, cit. nt. 44, p. 12 and ff, 
but above all p. 15. THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 21
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became the main kind of contract in Italy in the 90s and was used by 
companies for outsourcing purposes, as a replacement for steady 
employment
50. Legislation contributed to this by providing for increasingly 
significant social security cover, with a series of measures starting with 
the general reform of the pensions system (Art. 29 clause 2° Law 
335/95)
51, the introduction of compulsory health and accident insurance 
(Legislative Decree 38/2000) and maternity benefits. A further 
contribution was made by collective bargaining
52 and, less significantly, 
by the law courts, with important but isolated recognition of 
remuneration and legal protection.
53. Intervention by both collective 
bargaining and the courts, as a surrogate for organic legislative reform, 
are not judged sufficient to balance, in terms of security, the flexibility 
introduced into the system by massive recourse to coordinated, 
continuous work contracts. 
All this did not come about by means of radical systemic reform aimed 
at extending the protection regime for permanent employment to the 
new types of work
54, but through progressive, circumscribed and 
unsystematic adjustments to the system of labour law
55: this can by no 
                                                 
50    Reyneri op. cit. note 10, p. 23; for a recent quantitative analysis of continuous, 
coordinated but not permanent employment, cf. Altieri/Otieri, I lavori atipici, analisi e 
prospettive, Quaderni di rassegna sindacale, 2001, p. 13 ; for a similar phenomenon in 
Germany, see Waas in this volume. 
51   See essay by Fontana in this volume.   
52   See the first national collective contract for coordinated, continuous work stipulated on 
April  8 1998, as well as the framework agreement between the  Federazione CDO “non-
profit” and ALAI-CISL CGIL–NIDIL CPO–UIL, the temporary workers’ trade unions. In the 
state sector  see the “Accordo di regolamentazione relativo alle collaborazioni coordinate 
e continuative presso gli uffici e gli istituti centrali e periferici del Ministero per i beni e le 
attività culturali”, stipulated in 2000. 
53    Some relatively dated, such as Cass. civ., 12/04/1985, n.2433 which recognises the 
right of coordinated, continuous workers to fair pay and the right to strike; others are 
more recent, for example Pret. Monza, 10/07/1996. 
54   This was the sense of the proposal made under the previous government by left-wing 
politicians and trade unions, leading to the so-called Smuraglia project, named after an 
illustrious senator and jurist, requiring precise legislative definition of a new type of 
norm to regulate the grey area between subordinate employment and self-employment 
(a tertium genus); the proposal countered that of the moderate Left Wing, the Treu 
Project, which supported progressive legal extension of certain differentiated forms of 
protection according to a criterion of progressively concentric circles (a workers’ 
statute), without the need to define typologies, considered useless in a constantly 
changing context. For an analysis of the proposals and relative theoretical implications, 
see Perulli, Il disegno di legge sui lavoratori atipici, Lavoro  e Informazione, 1999, p. 5 
and ff. See also Biagi/Tiraboschi, Le proposte legislative in materia di lavoro 
parasubordinato: tipizzazione di uno «Statuto dei lavori» o codificazione di un tertium  
genus?, Lavoro e diritto, 1999 p. 571 
55   For a global evaluation of this phase of labour policy in Italy, see Treu, Politiche del 
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means be termed a distinctive sign of an organic labour policy inspired by 
the paradigm of flexicurity. 
Even the loosening up of the rigidity of previous legislation regarding 
working hours is part of this initial, non-organic embryo of legislative 
reforms based on flexicurity. 
In the late 90s there was a mini-reform of the previous rigid discipline 
regulating working hours (which went back to 1923). This reform only led 
to a partial adaptation of the Italian legal framework in compliance with 
the European working hours directive (EEC Directive 93/104, now EEC 
Directive 2003/88). It was therefore judged insufficient by the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice, which issued a sentence 
against the Italian State
56. This partial adaptation, however, contributed 
towards the feasibility of a more flexible model of working hours on a 
weekly and annual basis, in conformity with Art. 6 of the EU directive. 
This came about thanks to a substantial loosening of constraints on 
overtime and the acceptance of multi-period working hours schemes. 
These modules, which had already been tested by collective bargaining, 
left room for individual negotiation, within the limits of the framework 
provided by the collective contract (individual flexibility) and allowed 
working hours to be spread out in time in particular circumstances, even 
without trade union control (timely flexibility) 
57.   
§ 3: Flexibility as an ideology (the present) 
However, the undoubted results of this new strategy as far as 
employment rates are concerned, and the alarm bells being rung by 
economists and sociologists about the excess of systemic flexibility 
introduced into the labour market, have not mitigated either criticism of 
existing labour law or the demand for further amounts of legislative 
flexibility. This never-ending demand for a further wave of flexibility in 
the system (without security) from certain sectors of entrepreneurs has 
been taken up by the centre-right government which came to power at 
the beginning of this century. On coming to power, the government 
published a White Paper proposing reforms based on a type of flexibility 
which was said to comply with the indications given by EU institutions. 
The proposals were then transformed into a Parliamentary text   
(Delegatory Act n. 30/03), which came into effect  on October 24, 2003 
(Legislative Decree 276/2003) directly drawn up by the Government.  
                                                 
56 Case C-439/98 Commission of the European Communities / Italian Republic, decision of 
16 March 2000, at 
http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/en/documentation/sentenze/causa439-98en.htm  
57   For further reference, see the essay by Ricci in this volume. THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 23
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  In this transition from a statement of policy to concrete legislative 
implementation, all homage to the flexicurity paradigm of Dutch origin 
remains merely formal. In the section of the White Paper devoted to 
flexibility and security (II 3), in fact, indications are given as to reforms 
(part-time, occasional work, temporary work and intermediation, project 
work, fixed-term contracts, working hours) which, once implemented, will 
possess all the features of flexibility tout court, or unilateral flexibility: 
security appears to have vanished. Traces of security remain where it had 
already been introduced, for example in regulating agency-brokered 
employment (compulsory training and equal treatment). 
The operations of the new government and parliament are guided by 
the idea put forth in the European Commission Green Paper, where stress 
is above all laid on the concept of the flexible firm
58, tempered by 
frequent reference to partnership; all reference to security tends to fade, 
if not to dissolve into deregulation, as has been pointed out
59. It is a 
focalisation, to a certain extent subsequently adjusted by the Lisbon 
summit
60, in which unequivocal reference not only to the quantity but 
also to the quality of work implies greater investment in human 
resources, the exaltation of capabilities and training, and therefore the 
consequent, natural instruments of security.   
Some modifications, however, follow the lines of previous reforms: 
they represent a positive rationalisation of the tools used to regulate the 
labour market
61, not least by allowing private individuals or organisations 
                                                 
58   COM(1997)-128 11.04.1997 Green Paper. Partnership for a new organisation of work. 
For critical considerations on the idea of flexibility laid out in the document, see 
Ashiagbor, “Flexibility” and “adaptability in the EU employment strategy, op. cit. nt. 43, 
p. 390 and ff. In general regarding American cultural hegemony affecting ideas and 
concepts of flexibility, the labour market and welfare in Europe in the ’90s, see the 
significant book by Hutton, The World We’re In, 2003 Time Warner books, above all 
Chapter 5. 
59   Ashiagbor  op. cit. in note 58. 
60    For broad coverage of the summit, consult the Labour Web  site: 
http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/en/documentation/altridoc/speciale/lisbona.htm. 
Especially point 24 of the conclusions drawn by the President on 23-24 March 2000,   
“People are Europe's main asset and should be the focal point of the Union's policies. 
Investing in people and developing an active and dynamic welfare state will be crucial 
both to Europe's place in the knowledge economy and for ensuring that the emergence 
of this new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, 
social exclusion and poverty”. This strategy also emerges and is confirmed in more 
recent Commission  documents: see Commission Draft Joint Employment Report 
2003/2004, Brussels, 21.1.2004 COM(2004) 24 final, p.  23 ff; Scoreboard on 
implementing the social policy, Brussels, 01.03.2004 COM(2004) 137 final, pp. 6-7. See 
also Jobs, Jobs, Jobs  cit. at nt. 42 , p. 18 ff.  and  27 ff   
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to carry out intermediary activity via work agencies
62. Other changes to 
the overall normative framework inaugurate a new phase in the 
relationship between labour law and flexibility: the purely ideological and 
symbolic use of flexibility (which in this case becomes a real 
metaconcept) to cover up a profound de-structuring of some of the basic 
institutions of Italian labour law, which up to now had not been affected 
by previous reforms.  
I. The Berlusconi/Maroni (not Biagi) reform.  
a. Main contents   
The so-called  Biagi reform
63 represents a far-reaching change, 
comparable as regards the import of the regulatory intervention and the 
number of areas affected with what happened with the Workers’ Statute 
in 1970, but leading in the opposite direction as regards legal policy.   
The regulations introduced in 1970 aimed to strengthen the dominant 
social model of subordinate employment in the Fordist factory, which was 
taken as the ideal model for the whole of social organisation. It was made 
more rigid by surrounding it with various forms of protection. The 
attempt today is not to destructure from the inside a regulatory model 
founded on the Civil Code definition of the subordinate worker (Art. 2094) 
and the series of protective regulations that have since been introduced. 
The attempt is rather to neutralise it and transform it into just one of a 
number of models, regulating an ever-decreasing proportion of the 
overall workforce. Subordinate employment as the main beneficiary of a 
whole series of juridical effects  has not, that is, disappeared but its 
paradigmatic regulatory status has been diluted. 
This has been done by certain fundamental lines of action evident in 
three groups of regulations that can be summed up as follows: 
                                                 
62    On the strategic role of Temporary agency w o r k  a c t i n g  a s   h u m an capital managers 
rather than mere manpower suppliers, see the Kok report, cit. notes 42, 29 
63   As explained by Carinci in Una svolta tra ideologia e tecnica; continuità e discontinuità 
nel diritto del lavoro di inizio secolo, Italian Labour Law e-Journal, 
http://www.dirittodellavoro.it/public/current/ejournal/, there are valid reasons why the 
labour market reform introduced by Legislative Decree 276/03 should not be referred to 
as the “Biagi reform”: “Of form, because a law can be labelled with the name of the first 
person to propose it, that is, the person who claims both paternity and ultimate 
responsibility for it; but not with the name of a consultant, however authoritative, who 
remains detached from the institutional process, without the possibility of identifying and 
distinguishing his actual contribution, which is destined to count only if and to what 
extent it is taken into account by political legislation. Of substance, because what can 
certainly be attributed to Marco Biagi is the project set forth in the White Paper, whereas 
Legislative Decree 276/2003 was issued several months after his death, which makes sic 
et simpliciter attribution to him problematic, not only in spirit but also in practice”.  THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 25
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1.  One group of regulations should facilitate the spreading out and 
outsourcing of phases of the production cycle (staff leasing, 
subcontracting, undertaking transfer). With these measures the 
decree confines itself to accepting and facilitating outsourcing 
operations that respond to the real requirements of companies 
and are already a strong reality in the Italian labour market, with 
substantial backing from both national courts and the European 
Court of Justice. This is achieved, however, by introducing great 
uncertainty as to the borderline separating legal break-up 
operations and illegal brokering 
64.   
2.  With a second group of measures, the decree produces even 
further fragmentation. It does so by legally enlarging the grey 
area separating self-employed and subordinate work. Far from 
rationalising concrete social phenomena, the law creates an 
artificial legal fragmentation of types of work (coordinated work, 
project work, occasional work, occasional accessory work, with a 
series of internal distinctions; and then administered work, 
intermittent work and job sharing; and also various types of 
apprenticeship, starter contracts, and so on down to even more 
subtle distinctions, the declared aim being to increase revenue 
from contributions, eliminate the hidden economy and prevent 
fraudulent employment practices. The result is confusion, both 
conceptual and as regards practical application of the 
regulations
65.  Besides, whereas the picture is considerably 
complicated from a juridical viewpoint, no new objectives are 
pursued with a view to extending and strengthening protection for 
contingent workers and the decree fails to achieve all the 
requirements suggested by the Community “better job” policy. It 
totally neglects the fact that the correlation between quality and 
the type of work contract (temporary vs. permanent), working 
time (full time vs. part-time) and its nature (voluntary vs. 
involuntary), has been established at a European level. In 
other words, the nature of the work contract is considered a 
                                                 
64    Zappalà, Verso un nuovo assetto dei rapporti interpositori. Prime riflessioni sulla 
"tipizzazione" del contratto di somministrazione di lavoro, in Diritto delle relazioni 
industriali, n. 2, 2004. 
65    Experts, even those not aprioristically hostile to policies laying greater stress on the 
need for flexibility in the system, are radically critical of the technical solutions proposed 
in the reform, especially the regulation of new forms of non-subordinate work, cf. 
Pedrazzoli, Tipologie contrattuali a progetto e occasionali. Commento al Titolo VII del D. 
Lgs. 276/03 , WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" N. 29/2004; De Luca Tamajo, Dal 
lavoro parasubordinato al lavoro "a progetto" WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" N. 
25/2003, http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/ricerca/wp/default.htm 26                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  39/2004 
 
fundamental element of job quality
66. The result is that the so-
called border zone between self-employed and subordinate work is 
becoming less and less clear
67; observed through the new 
regulations, it is so artificially broken up into types and subtypes 
as to create a juridical labyrinth that might well lead to an 
increase in contentious procedures. This does not find favour 
either with employers, who are caught up in a mesh of unforeseen 
and unpredictable legal technicalities (above all because they 
come from a “friendly” government, whose stated aim was to 
simplify the labour market and render it more flexible), or with the 
trade unions, who stress the failure to increase  overall protection 
for contingent workers.  
3.  The explicit aim of a third group of regulations is to reduce space 
for judicial intervention (some explicitly limit control by judges 
based on “merits”
68) in favour of certification procedures. These 
procedures are assigned to a wide range of authorised bodies (not 
only bilateral institutions of various kinds, but also provincial 
employment bureaux and even state and private universities via 
forms of collaboration and agreements with individual labour law 
                                                 
66  This clashes quite clearly with labour policy suggestions from the ESS and Social Policy 
Agenda: see the Commission’s documents COM(2000)-379 and COM(2001)-313. See, 
also, the Joint Employment Report 2003/4 cit. in note  60: “Whereas greater flexibility 
may be needed in some Member States as regards standard contracts, a review of the 
contractual framework may also require strengthening security in non-standard 
contracts”. (Emphasis added) From that, converging indications: “Review the role of 
other forms of contracts with a view to providing more options for employers and 
employees depending on their needs” but also “Ensure there is adequate security for 
workers under all forms of contracts and prevent the emergence of two-tier labour 
markets”, p. 23. Along the same lines, see also the Kok Report quoted in note 62, p. 27 
“while promoting flexibility on the labour market, it is also important to foster new forms 
of security. Security in today’s labour markets is not a matter of preserving a job for life. 
In a more dynamic perspective, security is about building and preserving people’s ability 
to remain and progress in the labour market. It is related to decent pay, access to 
lifelong learning, working conditions, protection against discrimination or unfair 
dismissal, support in the case of job loss and the right to transfer acquired social rights 
when moving jobs”. For an evaluation of the EES see Kenner, EU Employment Law, 
From Rome to Amsterdam and beyond,  Hart, 2000, pp. 491-505. In general, on the 
European strategy on quality  of work see Goetshy, A transition year for employment in 
Europe: EU governance and national diversity under scrutiny, Industrial Relations, 
Journal, 2002, 414 ff   
67   Davies, Lavoro subordinato e lavoro autonomo, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 2000, p. 
207; Supiot, Le noveaux visages de la subordination, Droit Social, 2000, p. 131 and ff; 
see also Fontana and Waas in this volume. 
68   Cf. Clause 3, Art. 27, Legislative Decree 276/03, which expressly excludes the possibility 
of judicial control being extended to “evaluations and technical decisions, […] which are 
the responsibility of the user”. THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 27
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academics), and can be used in cases of uncertainty to provide 
legal qualification of types of work relationship. The decree 
appears, that is, to propose a preventive remedy for the probable 
counterintuitive effects of the uncertainty of the regulations, 
introducing alternative procedural mechanisms for certification. 
The procedures obviously amount to a Freudian admission of the 
chaos that has been created.  But what clearly emerges is a legal 
policy that had already been explicitly stated in the government’s 
White Paper
69: the measures were not devised on the basis of a 
legitimate need to deflate labour claims in the law courts, 
providing incentives for alternative forms of arbitration
 70, but 
betray a clear lack of confidence and negative attitude towards 
labour court judges and judicial intervention in general. These 
provisions are hard to classify among the traditional tools used to 
prevent legal action from being brought  (conciliation, mediation), 
nor do they belong to the class of classical adjudication tools such 
as arbitration. The attempt is to get round proceedings in labour 
courts by disproportionately multiplying the number of subjects 
entrusted with non-consensual prevention litigation powers. 
These, in fact, are not only the traditional social partners, in a 
classical scheme in which this function is devolved to collective 
autonomy, but also subjects and institutions in civil society ( for 
example, universities), in a scheme disputably referring to 
horizontal subsidiarity. Without going into noble principles like 
subsidiarity, it is more probably a stratagem to limit judicial 
control; a mechanism that has been defined as “technically 
cunning” rather than well-constructed, the practical effectiveness 
of which remains to be seen. The certification procedures are also 
entrusted with a new regulatory technique inspired by 
flexisecurity: assisted derogation. By this procedural mechanism 
workers can renounce or negotiate acquired rights before bilateral 
institutions  (in this case, not universities) and not only before the 
traditional trade union and administrative commissions. This is not 
particularly innovative, as it is already provided for in the Italian 
system (final clause, Art. 2113 Italian Civil Code).   The only 
innovation lies in the fact that the conciliation and transaction 
functions are entrusted to new institutional subjects – bilateral 
entities – which can “assist” workers in an activity that is already 
                                                 
69   Government White Paper on the Labour Market Reform, § I.3.7., Rome 2001.  
70   Caruso, Sindacato, arbitrato e conflitto collettivo, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 1992, 
pp. 47-49. 28                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  39/2004 
 
possible in other institutional contexts. According to a much more 
destructured interpretation of the current situation, the new 
system offers the individual worker the possibility, with the 
assistance of those entrusted with certification, of forgoing 
treatment that is by law inderogable; that is, he can forgo 
standard legal and contractual terms ex ante, when he is hired, or 
during the employment relationship itself. This radically modifies 
the protection mechanism based on the inderogable regulation 
whereby acquired rights can be forgone for transaction purposes, 
but preventive renunciation of standard treatment is impossible
71 .  
  Of significance are also certain modifications introduced by 
legislation other than the “great” reform contained in Legislative 
Decree 276/03, in particular as regards fixed-term contracts and 
working hours.  
a)  Fixed-term contracts are regulated by Legislative Decree 
368/2001, which implements the EU directive  . The new 
regulations signal a departure from a model which details a limited 
number of legal and contractual types considered to be exceptions 
to the general rule. The new model introduced provides general 
grounds legitimising the stipulation of fixed-term contracts for 
"reasons of a technical, production, organisational or substitutive 
nature". In this way fixed-term contracts become a “normal” tool 
to determine the makeup of company workforces, juxtaposed to 
but not countering permanent contracts. This contradicts both 
indications from the European social partners (the agreement 
incorporated in the directive)
72 and recent trends in other 
European countries (Portugal, Spain) to support permanent 
employment and discourage excessive recourse to fixed-term 
contracts
73. The new regulations also greatly re-dimension the 
monitoring role of collective bargaining, signalling a significant 
                                                 
71    There is already a large amount of debate on these provisions (Title VIII of the 
Legislative Decree) and the problem of interpreting them. For two opposing opinions, 
see Ghera , La certificazione dei contratti di lavoro, in Mercato del lavoro. Riforma e 
vincoli di sistema, ed. by De Luca Tamajo, Rusciano, Zoppoli, Napoli 2004, p. 277 and ff. 
for the destructured interpretation; and Bellavista, La derogabilità assistita nel d.lgs. n. 
276/2003, WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" N. 35/2004, for the more reductive 
interpretation. 
72    Cf. Foreword to EEC Directive 99/70, which states in point 6 that permanent work 
contracts represent the most common form of work relationships   
   For the effects of the directive on the German system, see essay by Preis and Gotthardt 
in this volume. 
73  Cf. the recent Kok report, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, op. cit. in note 42, which makes explicit 
reference to action of this kind. THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 29
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break with the model of negotiated flexibility applied up to now. 
Although the government’s aim was to introduce a “more simple 
and controllable system” of fixed-term contracts, the new 
regulations, above all on account of the extremely generic nature 
of their general grounds, would appear to have led to a framework 
of rules which employers themselves find hard to apply, thus 
increasing the margins for discretionary rulings by judges 
assessing their legitimacy
74.  
b)  In connection with working hours, the EU directive is implemented 
via Legislative Decree 66/2003. The reform increase the system’s 
overall degree of flexibility, above all as regards suppression of 
the maximum limit on daily working hours, the system of breaks 
and rest periods, and the mechanism of derogation. Although it 
does not introduce individual opting out (provided for by UK 
legislation) and despite the significant permanence of a system of 
collective bargaining, post-reform regulation of working hours in 
the Italian system possesses a degree of flexibility comparable to 
that of the UK and certainly greater than that of other Member 
States (like Holland, Spain and Germany)
75. It can, however, be 
s t a t e d  t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  constraints imposed by the EU 
directive have placed limits on reforms which would have entailed 
more profound destructuring of the previous system of worker 
protection. 
b. Legal policy and regulatory techniques 
What is interesting to note in the legal policy and regulatory technique 
used in the new legislation is that the objectives outlined above are not 
pursued via deregulation of the labour market, in line with the neo-liberal 
thought dominant in the 80s, that is, an attack on the power of the trade 
unions and abrogation or reduction of protection for permanent 
subordinate work. Trade unions do not come under direct attack. The 
tactics are more subtle the legislation provides incentive for division and 
conflict between the major trade union confederations, isolating the CGIL 
76.  
                                                 
74   See Zappalà in this volume. 
75   See Ricci, Fuchs in this volume. 
76  This strategy is institutionally reflected (besides the social pact agreed on with the CISL 
and UIL alone, the so-called Pact for Italy, and the support given by these two 
confederations alone for fixed-term contracts: see essay by Zappalà in this volume) is 
the constant use in the Decree provisions referring to collective bargaining of the 
preposition “by” instead of “of” with reference to the comparatively most representative 
unions. This implies that negotiated integrations of the flexibility introduced by law can 
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As regards reducing existing protection for subordinate workers, the 
only proposal made by the government
77 – strongly supported by 
Confindustria, the largest association of entrepreneurs (but not by all 
entrepreneurs) – has drowned under a wave of social and trade union 
opposition and has not got past the bill stage in Parliament. 
The decree relies on an articulated regulatory technique in which the 
only really clear element among a series of ambiguities is the desire to 
introduce pretentious re-regulation of the labour law system in the light 
of the legislative policies outlined above (§ 3.1.).    
If we consider the position taken by sociologists and economists – that 
is, that the ideal of flexibility for enterprise is the possibility to adapt 
labour with no limits or obstacles to the increasingly variable 
requirements of production and the economic cycle – it becomes 
apparent that the decree does not head in this direction. There is no 
reduction to legal regulations in favour of individual contracts – still 
legally regulated by on a different institutional basis from the law and 
collective contracts
78 - which is the classical deregulation formula 
79.  
Other experiments with deregulation via legal hyper-regulation – the 
oxymoron of deregulation via juridification – for example the Australian 
Work Relations Act of 1996, but they do not appear to have produced 
particularly positive results even as far as the interests of employers are 
concerned. They have certainly resulted in an increase in uncertainty of 
interpretation, lawsuits and arbitration, and conflicts in the workplace 
itself
80 . 
To make work more flexible, therefore, Italian legislators do not rely 
on the market and individual contracts, which are typical of market-
                                                 
77   Modification of Art. 18 of the Workers’ Statute, rightly or wrongly considered to be a sort 
of symbol of the cultural heritage of post-Constitutional labour law, which establishes 
that a worker unfairly dismissed must be taken back on and reinstated rather than being 
offered the alternative of financial compensation. 
78   Supiot, The Dogmatic Foundations of the Market, op. cit. nt. 22. 
79 Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World, Harvard University Press, 1995. For an 
analysis of the concepts of deregulation and re-regulation, see Ashiagbor, “Flexibility” 
and “adaptability” in the EU employment strategy, op. cit. nt. 43, p. 393 and ff.,  and 
references contained therein.  
80    Mitchell, Juridification and Labour Law: A Legal Response to the Flexibility Debate in 
Australia, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
1998 p. 115 and 134-135. On the insecurity effect of Australian reforms, see de Ruyter 
and Burgess, Growing Labour Insecurity in Australia and the UK in the Midst of Job 
Growth: Beware the Anglo- Saxon Model, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
2003, pp 223–243. For an comparative analysis of individualization policies in Australia, 
United Kindom, New Zeland and Japan see the essays in Deery-Mitchell (editors) 
Employment relations individualisation and union exclusion : an international study, The 
Federation Press, 2000 THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN LABOUR LAW. THE ITALIAN CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 31
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oriented policies, but on sophisticated, closely-interwoven, concurrent 
regulatory tools: the law, collective bargaining at various levels, and also 
soft law (reference is frequently made to good practice and codes of 
behaviour, but with serious systematic anomalies
81) and administrative 
regulation supplementing collective bargaining where the latter does not 
apply. The result is a Russian doll of regulation, symptomatic of a 
regulatory bulimia that has few precedents in the history of Italian labour 
legislation. 
The consequence is an intricate entanglement of sources that answers 
no systemic or systematic logic: it is based on no perception of the 
complexity of the phenomena to be regulated, or of  consequent need to 
coordinate, calibrate and integrate the various regulatory techniques in 
order to achieve an optimal balance in a virtuous circle like that of the 
reflexive regulation model
82 . Nor is it possible to perceive an intention to 
mediate between different policies and objectives (flexibility and security) 
via balanced doses of different regulatory techniques. Nor, finally, is 
there any attempt to coordinate the system of legal regulations with the 
system of bargaining, even at a decentralised territorial level, to generate 
a form of reflexive regulation that presupposes consent and confidence 
but which in the end has the effect of generating such consent and 
confidence. Collective bargaining is at times opportunistically 
instrumentalised for purposes of flexibility that are already fully 
predetermined by the law; at others it is forced into “unfair competition”  
with individual contracts. 
For example, regulation via collective bargaining no longer acts, as it 
did in the past, as a shield against and limit to individual bargaining for 
supplementary work and flexible, elastic clauses in part-time work. 
Collective bargaining is offered as an alternative to individual bargaining, 
thus encouraging employers to elude collective regulation. If, as the new 
regulations allow, they can choose freely between flexibility in part-time 
                                                 
81  I have pointed out these anomalies in the use of soft law in Legislative Decree 276/03 in 
Caruso, Il diritto del lavoro tra hard law e soft law : nuove funzioni e nuove  tecniche 
normative, a paper presented at the Brescia Seminar titled “Nuove forme di decisione e 
nuove forme di regolazione: il metodo del coordinamento aperto nel processo di 
integrazione europea”, 9 - 10 February, 2004. 
82    For a reconstruction of the process of European social harmonisation using this 
technique, cf. Barnard, Deaking, Hobb, Capabilities and Rights: an Emerging Agenda for 
Social Rights?, Industrial Law Journal, 2001, p. 478; Deakin, Two Types of Regulatory 
Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonization. A Law and 
Economics perspective on Centros, The Cambridge Yearbook of European Lega1 
Studies,1999, p. 244-245. See  also, with regard to the OMC, Barnard and Deakin, In 
Search of Coherence: Social Policy, the Single Market and Fundamental Rights, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 2000, pp. 340-343. 32                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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work, regulated individually but within the limits established by collective 
contracts, and flexibility negotiated (i.e. unilaterally imposed) exclusively 
via individual contracts, they will obviously choose the latter, more 
convenient alternative 
83.  
Part-time work is not the only case in which workers are left on their 
own in front of flexibility imposed by law, with the pseudo-freedom and 
individual self-protection that could derive from work contract tools; it 
also applies to intermittent work, which is the Italian version of on-call 
work, where workers even have specific contractual responsibilities and 
are liable to pay compensation in the event of breach of contract. These 
are just two of a number of examples. 
In short, the logic is rather narrow-minded, of a flexibility often sought 
but not declared as such, of an ambiguous way of getting round obstacles 
and guarantees instead of removing them, the end result of which is only 
confusion and a wide range of muddled interpretations. 
 
 
§ 4: Flexibility as a challenge for European Labour Law 
The contamination of labour law by the mutating virus of flexibility 
may have a dual outcome: it can either dissolve or strengthen the 
organism. 
 It cannot be denied that the recent reforms in Italy - oriented towards 
a de-structuring form of flexibility which is claimed to be the result of 
decisions made by EU institutions and their neo-laissez-faire policies – 
would seem to make the fatality hypothesis the more plausible one. 
This hypothesis, however, is not supported by a significant number of 
labour law scholars, who see the co-ordination of national labour law 
systems on the basis of EU constitutional principles and values as a new 
horizon for the construction of a social model that will tackle the problem 
of finding a common response to the challenge of flexibility. 
This will be achieved via renewal that does not totally upset national 
traditions if one believes in the inheritance left by a great pioneer of 
cultural integration between European labour law scholars, Otto Kahn 
Freund, who saw a balance between tradition and renewal as the only 
                                                 
83   I have dealt with this aspect of the regulation of part-time work in Caruso, Riforma del 
part time e diritto sociale europeo: verso una teoria dei limiti ordinamentali, in De Luca 
Tamajo Rusciano Zoppoli (ed.), Mercato del lavoro. Riforma e vincoli di sistema, Napoli 
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way to develop labour law in conditions that were profoundly different 
from those surrounding its origins
84. 
Within this framework there is also room for the concept of flexibility, 
provided that emphasis is laid on the etymological meaning of re-
adaptation of an entity to external changes in the systemic context. 
And it is for this reason, a philological one, that the concept cannot be 
accepted in an unqualified fashion or excessively elasticised so as to 
justify any attempt at de-structuring the national Constitutional 
traditions, which are the values by which the current-treaty-based 
constitutional setup of the EU are based
85 and which will become explicit 
in the new European Constitution, hopefully in the very near future
86.  
On the contrary, the concept of flexibility needs explaining and 
decanting: it has to be filtered, that is, by a mesh of values that are 
becoming an increasingly important part of the common constitutional 
heritage of European populations
87.  
In this general perspective it is easy to understand why many feel that 
to remedy the destructive dynamics of the meta concept it is necessary 
to “normalise” and control it by introducing attributes and predicates (in 
the guise of antibodies) representing policies that contrast with those of 
neo- laissez-faire but still support reformism rather than social 
democratic conservatism: flexibility and security, sustainable flexibility 
and soft flexibility are but a few examples. 
                                                 
84 Khan Freund, Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment, Oxford 1979 (tr. it. Kahn 
Freund, Le relazioni sindacali: tradizione e rinnovamento DLRI, 1980, 7 p. 413 ff.).  
85   The reference is to Art. 6 § 2 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the European 
Union.  
86   For a detached examination of the draft launched by the Convention in July 2003, see 
Ziller, La nuova Costituzione Europea, Il Mulino, Bologna 2003. From a more critical 
viewpoint, see Weiler, A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 2002, 563. 
87   The European Charter of fundamental rights incorporated in the new Constitution makes 
explicit reference to social rights; also of significance is the reference in the general 
provisions of Title I to concepts such as “equality”, “non discrimination”, and solidarity” 
(Art.  I-2 of the Constitution Project - Values of the Union); as well as “market-based 
social economy”, “full employment”, “social progress”, “the fight against social 
exclusion”, “justice and social protection”, “equality between men and women”, 
“solidarity between the generations (Art. I-3: Objectives of the Union). Debate on the 
hopes and limits of the new provisions is already under way. On the limits to rights 
through the so-called horizontal provisions of the Charter, see De Burca, Beyond the 
Charter: How Enlargement has enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the EU, paper, par. 
4. In general, see the essays in the volumes edited by Hepple, Labour rights in a global 
context. International and Comparative Perspectives, CUB, 2003 and Hervey/Kenner,   
Economic  and Socia1 Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights - A Lega1 
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It is therefore also important to look at the contexts in which the best 
policies and bargaining practices, and the most interesting legislative 
reforms have been implemented: in particular the above-mentioned 
cases of Holland and Denmark. 
What is important to point out is that these formulae, which may 
appear abstract, ambiguous or even manipulative, hide a fervent 
purposefulness, a striving towards renewal that involves the broad 
spectrum of labour law: its regulatory techniques and labour policies, the 
redefinition of rights and forms of protection, and the rules governing the 
functioning of the labour market.   
This would take us far from the scope of the present paper; what we 
can do here and now is to present a synthesis or synopsis of a sort of 
agenda (highly concrete legislative and bargaining practices) on which 
the scientific community of European labour law experts, as well as 
legislators and the social partners can act, at both a national and 
supranational level.  
•  The re-qualification of forms of protection not only in employment 
relationships but also in the labour market (the experience of the 
employment pool and the concept of a transitional market)
88, 
through redefinition of the structure and function of social security 
and unemployment benefits
89.   
•  Full recognition of the professional capabilities of the individual 
combined with protection of his dignity, as a compass for new 
rights (ongoing training, re-qualification, etc.) 
90. 
•  The possibility of reconciling family and work commitments, 
private life and working life.   
•  The principle of non-discrimination, besides that of inderogability, 
as the mainstream norm of all social and other policies.  
                                                 
88  For a model that presupposes a negotiative  strategy for a soft, progressive reversal of 
de-standardisation, see Regalia, Decentralizing Employment Protection in Europe: 
Territorial Pacts and Beyond, in Zeitlin/Trubek (ed), Governing Work and Welfare in a 
New Economy, OUP, 2003, p. 158 ff. 
89   See the Amato Treu document presented on behalf of the Olive Tree alliance in 2002, 
the “Carta dei diritti delle lavoratrici e dei lavoratori”, which may be the future policy 
statement of post-Berlusconi parliaments. 
90   Barnard, Deakin, Hobbs, Capabilities and Rights: An emerging agenda for Social Rights?, 
Industrial Law Journal, p. 464 and ff; Brown, Deakin, Wilkinson, Capabilities, Social 
Rights and European Market Integration, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University 
of Cambridge  Working Paper 253; Salais, Work and Welfare: Toward a Capability 
Approach, in Zeitlin, op. cit. in note 88. Freedland, Employment Policy, in Davis, Lyon 
Caen, Sciarra, Simitis (ed), European Labour Community Law, Principles and 
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•  The possibility of reconciling and weighting the interests of labour 
demand and supply as a criterion in assessing the sustainability 
and juridical legitimacy of all new flexibility measures.    
•  Entrusting the task of protecting the social values enshrined in the 
European Constitution to a custodian of the common constitutional 
heritage: the Court of Justice as guarantor against any risk of a 
deterioration and retrogression in national standards on grounds 
of European policy implementation. 
 
This is the possible agenda that can realistically be attributed to labour 
law in its new supranational dimension faced with the contamination 
deriving from flexibility. The lines of action it provides address above all 
policies, but do not neglect the broader issue of the regulatory techniques 
needed to act as vectors for these policies. Here again, the issue is open 
to debate in national systems and the European dimension. The 
transformations on the horizon, the possible use of new techniques such 
as soft law and the open method of coordination, can be considered 
innovative procedural elements if the objectives to be reached and values 
to be pursued are pre-established and clear. The tools can thus be 
assessed in terms of their relative functionality and adequacy for these 
objectives and cannot therefore be either turned into fetishes or 
delegitimised as mere Horses of Troy for deregulation policies
91.   
§ 5: A Final remark. Flexibility and trade union 
representation 
As Khan Freund taught, however, law can do much to regulate labour, 
but not everything. There is no doubt that flexibility cannot be reduced to 
a concept, nor to a meta concept, and not even to a mere policy. 
Flexibility also implies a social and individual dimension in work 
relationships and other spheres that cannot be simply entrusted to 
normative regulation and its colonising tendencies. 
It is a dimension in which an important role is still played by modes of 
organisation, action and bargaining on the part of social and collective 
actors (above all trade unions but also other organisations such as NGOs 
and environment protection organisations); and great responsibility is 
given to their capacity to represent these new interests, which have very 
                                                 
91   The debate on soft law, the OMC and labour law is too broad and complex to summarise 
in a simple footnote. I have tried to outline some trends in the paper referenced in note  
81. It is, however, quite clear that the new strategic regulatory choice, from Lisbon on, 
in order  to achieve employment and social goals formulated in the EES, is a 
combination of traditional and new means, such as legislation, social dialogue, structural 
fund, OMC, mainstreaming; see Kenner, EU Employment law, op. cit. in note 66, p. 498.   36                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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little in common with those on which the classical models of 
representation and organisational modules of European trade unions were 
forged. 
These models are under great pressure in all national systems. Even in 
Italy, where the model of horizontal organisation and general 
representation of labour has hardly ever been questioned, in its current 
forms it seems incapable of intercepting the demands and interests of the 
new generation of flexible workers.  
It is not only a cultural and organisational delay but also a more or 
less conscious decision to adjust representational strategies to the point 
indicated by the compass representing the desire to preserve the hard 
core of union members, unions and their apparatus.  
It is, for example, not quite clear what model of representation Italian 
trade unions are oriented towards for flexible workers: whether towards 
integrating within the horizontal and vertical categories specific structures 
that can develop specific policies for the representation of flexible and 
precarious workers (as in the French model, which would seem much 
more effective); or whether to separate the organisational structures for 
these workers completely, accepting the hypothesis of their special 
nature and thus the need for separate representation policies. Again, it 
does not seem clear whether the model of territorial and confederate 
representation that has always characterised Italian trade unions has 
provided an opportunity to reformulate strategies aimed at territorial 
unification of interests that appear to be segmented in the workplace and 
labour markets within enterprises.  
92 
The season of territorial and local pacts in Italy has given good results 
as regards regulatory strategies and policies affecting local labour 
markets, but relatively little has been achieved as regards the planning of 
new models of aggregation and organisation of interests and the re-
establishment of union representation
93.   
This failure to respond by the models and forms of union 
representation cannot be compensated for by a surplus of mobilisation 
regarding directly political objectives, as has happened in Italy in the last 
few years.   
Political mobilisation by trade unions against government decisions 
that are most openly in contrast with the social values and interests they 
                                                 
92   Cf. the literature referenced in note 5, and also Regalia, cit. supra in note 88, p. 174 and 
ff. For an American perspective cf. Stone, From Globalism to Regionalism: Protecting 
Labor Rights in a Post-National Era, paper presented at the  Intell 7 Conference, Kyoto, 
March 2004. 
93   Caruso cit. in note 16; also Albi, La contrattazione sindacale nella programmazione per 
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represent may be a useful tonic but it is not capable of protecting the 
organism against the fatal disease threatening it, thus determining, in the 
middle to long term, the decline of the historic form of labour 
representation, not only in Italy but also in the rest of Europe.   
It is also true that the widespread practice of political and bargaining-
based concertation at a supranational, national and local level, with all 
due functional distinctions, cannot represent a political and institutional 
surrogate for the crisis of social representation. At most it may be a 
useful complement.   
Even in the case of union representation, then, the impact with 
flexibility is located on the crest of the same alternative previously 
analysed for labour law: it may have a fatal outcome, but it may have the 
effect of triggering off a regenerating reaction.  
It is not in the style of Italian labour law scholars to provide trade 
union organisations and leadership with solutions or advice as to how to 
renew their representational practice and policies. Those who have tried 
to do so have not had much luck. It may be hoped that flexibility viewed 
as a positive adaptation to a changing reality may be a useful spur to 
those who hold responsibility for understanding the new interests and 
demands for representation that are coming to the fore in the workplace, 
and that they act accordingly. This will also have to take place, in all 
probability, in a broader territorial space than the individual nation state. 
A space in which not only customs barriers, but also political and cultural 
boundaries will finally become increasingly evanescent.     
 
 Table 1 – Workers in standard and non-standard employment (thousands of units)       
          
   Apr. 1995 Apr. 1996 Apr. 1997 Apr. 1998 Apr. 1999Apr. 2000Apr. 2001
Apr. 
2002 
 
EMPLOYED WORKERS  19.978 20.095 20.184 20.357 20.618 20.930 21.373 21.757
STANDARD 17.949 18.037 17.985 18.035 17.998 18.073 18.432 18.781
-  Full-time self-employed  5.377 5.440 5.399 5.443 5.411 5.435 5.497 5.550
-  Full-time permanent employees  12.572 12.597 12.587 12.592 12.588 12.638 12.935 13.231
NON-STANDARD 2.029 2.058 2.198 2.323 2.619 2.857 2.941 2.976
-  Part-time permanent employees  571 609 641 690 748 873 1.005 996
-  Full-time fixed-term employees 720 730 776 817 988 1.006 1.003 1.106
-  Part-time fixed-term employees  303 319 361 416 459 517 468 452
-  Part-time self-employed  435 400 420 399 425 461 465 42238                                                     BRUNO CARUSO 
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Table 2 – Workers in standard and non-standard employment (%)         
          
   Apr. 1995 Apr. 1996 Apr. 1997 Apr. 1998 Apr. 1999Apr. 2000Apr. 2001
Apr. 
2002 
 
EMPLOYED WORKERS  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
STANDARD 89,8 89,8 89,1 88,6 87,3 86,3 86,2 86,3
-  Full-time self-employed  26,9 27,1 26,7 26,7 26,2 26,0 25,7 25,5
-  Full-time permanent employees  62,9 62,7 62,4 61,9 61,1 60,4 60,5 60,8
NON-STANDARD 10,2 10,2 10,9 11,4 12,7 13,7 13,8 13,7
-  Part-time permanent employees 2,9 3,0 3,2 3,4 3,6 4,2 4,7 4,6
-  Full-time fixed-term employees 3,6 3,6 3,8 4,0 4,8 4,8 4,7 5,1
-  Part-time fixed-term employees  1,5 1,6 1,8 2,0 2,2 2,5 2,2 2,1
-  Part-time self-employed  2,2 2,0 2,1 2,0 2,1 2,2 2,2 1,9
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